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Coordination and Monitoring in Changes 
of Control: The Controversial Role of 
“Wolf Packs” in Capital Markets*
ANITA ANAND & ANDREW MIHALIK†
Given recent empirical work suggesting that Canada is one of two countries in which outcomes 
favourable to shareholder activists are more likely than in the United States, one might 
wonder whether shareholders in Canadian public companies have become too empowered. 
This concern takes on particular significance in light of controversies arising from the 
emergence of “wolf packs”: loose networks of parallel-minded shareholders (typically 
hedge funds) that act together to effect change in a given corporation without disclosing 
their collective interest. This article analogizes the role of wolf packs in the corporation 
to that of a blockholder. It isolates certain conditions that facilitate the formation of wolf 
packs such that wolf packs are able to overcome the coordination costs that can ordinarily 
impede shareholders from forming de facto blocs to monitor a corporation’s directors and 
management. At the same time, however, they are able to circumvent the disclosure rules 
that typically apply to such groups. Because wolf packs are able to wield significant influence 
in corporate affairs without disclosing their collective interest to other investors, this article 
argues that the disclosure rules relating to wolf packs in Canada should, as a first step, be 
clarified.
Les récentes études empiriques montrent que le Canada est l’un des deux seuls pays où 
les actionnaires activistes sont plus susceptibles d’obtenir des résultats favorables qu’aux 
États-Unis. Un tel constat amène à se demander si les actionnaires des entreprises 
publiques canadiennes ne se sont pas vu accorder trop de pouvoirs. Cette préoccupation 
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revêt une importance particulière à la lumière des controverses soulevées par l’émergence 
des « meutes de loups », ces réseaux informels d’actionnaires à la logique parallèle 
(généralement des fonds spéculatifs) qui agissent de concert pour produire des changements 
dans une entreprise donnée sans divulguer leur intérêt collectif. Le présent article compare 
le rôle d’une meute de loups au sein d’une entreprise à celui d’un actionnaire dominant. Il 
cerne certaines conditions qui contribuent à la formation des meutes de loups et les rendent 
capables de surmonter les coûts de coordination qui empêchent traditionnellement les 
actionnaires de former des alliances effectives pour surveiller les administrateurs et l’équipe 
dirigeante d’une entreprise. Dans le même temps, les meutes de loups peuvent contourner 
les règles de divulgation qui s’appliquent généralement à ce groupe d’actionnaires. Étant 
donné que les meutes de loups peuvent exercer une influence notable sur les affaires 
générales sans divulguer leur intérêt collectif aux autres investisseurs, cet article avance 
que les règles de divulgation applicables aux meutes de loups au Canada mériteraient avant 
tout d’être précisées.
CORPORATE LAW IN CANADA SEEKS TO MEDIATE the relationship between a 
corporation’s directors and its shareholders by assigning each a distinct set of legal 
rights.1 A recent empirical study found Canada to be one of only two countries 
in which outcomes favourable to activist shareholders are more likely than in the 
United States.2 Have shareholders of public companies in the Canadian capital 
markets become too empowered, and if so, what legal rules should govern their 
1. According to the Dickerson Report, balancing the tension between directors and 
shareholders is the normative underpinning of Canadian corporate law. Robert WV 
Dickerson et al, Proposal for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, vol 1 (Ottawa: 
Information Canada, 1971) at 3 [Dickerson Report]. Dickerson and his co-authors write,
Nor can we see any practical way that, at least in the “public” corporation, shareholders could 
be involved in corporate administration. This is not to say, however, that directors should not be 
responsible for their actions and accountable to shareholders and others for what they do (ibid at 3). 
2. Marco Becht et al, “The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study,” 
European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper No 402 (March 2015) at 37-51, 
online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2376271>. The Netherlands 
is the other country in which activist outcomes are significantly more likely than in 
the United States.
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behaviour?3 The topic’s importance is unquestionable in light of controversies 
arising from the emergence of “wolf packs,” which are loose networks of 
parallel-minded shareholders (typically hedge funds) that act together to effect 
change in a given corporation without disclosing their collective interest.4 Wolf 
packs are able to circumvent the disclosure rules typically applied to shareholders 
that act together by deliberately avoiding being characterized as a “group” for 
the purposes of US securities laws or as “acting jointly or in concert” for the 
purposes of Canadian securities laws. As is the case with a group of prowling 
wolves, the lead wolf (shareholder) might be visible to its prey while the other 
wolves (shareholders) appear only when necessary.
Building on the theme of this special issue on controversial markets, this 
article probes the role of wolf packs in Canadian law and particularly in change 
of control transactions, including proxy contests. Changes of control, especially 
in a contested or hostile context, are controversial given that the target may have 
other strategic intentions that the board conceives to be in its long-term best 
interests. Wolf packs add another element of controversy to changes of control 
as they are typically designed to form before the share price appreciation that 
typically accompanies a change of control transaction. Further, they are able to 
overcome the coordination costs and other impediments that smaller shareholders 
experience in forming de facto blocks, thereby making the threat of a proxy 
contest or a push for a sale of the company more viable.
In particular, there are certain circumstances in which shareholder cooperation 
generally, and wolf pack behaviour specifically, are able to overcome these 
costs. This article identifies five conditions that facilitate the formation of wolf 
packs. Our model suggests that corporations characterized by large institutional 
shareholders facilitate wolf pack formation because these shareholders are 
generally sophisticated, rational actors that can coordinate with each other. 
As sophisticated actors, these shareholders may be motivated by the share price 
3. There is a significant amount of debate on this topic in the US literature. Some scholars 
have advocated for greater shareholder empowerment. See e.g. Lucian A Bebchuk, “Letting 
Shareholders Set the Rules” (2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1784; Lucian Bebchuk, “The Case 
for Increasing Shareholder Power” (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 833. Others, by contrast, have 
advocated for corporate laws that place greater power in the board of directors. See e.g. Iman 
Anabtawi, “Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power” (2006) 53 UCLA L Rev 
561; Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment” (2006) 
119 Harv L Rev 1735.
4. John C Coffee, Jr & Darius Palia, “The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and 
Implications” (2014) European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper No 266, 
online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496518>.
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increase that tends to follow the filing of mandated disclosures when shareholders 
pass prescribed thresholds of ownership in a corporation’s shares. Coordination 
among wolf pack members is facilitated by corporate and securities laws, which 
explicitly allow coordination among a small group of shareholders and can drive 
the lead activist to focus its recruitment efforts on larger shareholders. This model 
is especially pertinent to Canadian capital markets, which are characterized by 
institutional shareholders that hold sizable positions in public corporations.5
Currently, two hypotheses explain wolf pack formation.6 John C. Coffee 
and Darius Palia contemplate the possibility that a lead activist might recruit 
other investors to join a pack before filing disclosure regarding its holdings.7 By 
contrast, Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews assert that a coordination game drives 
wolf pack formation since individual shareholders are incentivized to join wolf 
packs without explicit coordination by a lead member.8 The rational self-interest 
of the members of the wolf pack is sufficient for the wolf pack to form on the basis 
of implicit coordination. These two models—which we refer to as the “explicit 
coordination” and “implicit coordination” models respectively—are informative 
but insufficient. The explicit coordination model focuses primarily on the timing 
of a wolf pack’s formation relative to the relevant legal rule relating to disclosure 
of the lead activist’s shareholding. The implicit coordination model discounts the 
importance of a lead activist in coordinating the wolf pack.
Our argument endeavours to push the analysis of wolf pack formation 
beyond these two hypotheses by isolating conditions (in addition to timing) that 
might engender shareholder coordination. We focus on investor sophistication 
as a contributing element to wolf pack formation. We also highlight the benefits 
of wolf packs for smaller, less sophisticated shareholders who free-ride on the 
5. Richard Bozec et al find that 58 per cent of Canadian issuers feature at least one controlling 
shareholder that owns shares representing more than 10 per cent of the voting rights in 
respect of the issuer. Richard Bozec, Mohamed Dia & Yves Bozec, “Corporate Ownership 
and Governance Practices in Canada: A Longitudinal Study” (2015) 4:1 J Int’l Corp Gov 
51 [“Corporate Ownership”]. See also Randall K Morck, David A Stangeland & Bernard 
Yeung, “Inherited Wealth Corporate Control and Economic Growth: The Canadian 
Disease?” in Randall K Morck, ed, Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000).
6. For a more detailed explanation of these hypotheses, see Yu Ting Forester Wong, “Wolves 
at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund Activism” (2016) Columbia Business School 
Research Paper No 16-11, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2721413>.
7. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 23-24, 28-29.
8. Alon Brav, Amil Dasgupta & Richmond D Mathews, “Wolf Pack Activism” (2016) Robert 
H Smith School Working Paper No RHS 2529230, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2529230>.
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activism of the lead wolf or shareholder. Finally, we analogize the monitoring 
function performed by lead wolves to that performed by blockholders generally.
A further difference between our argument and the existing models 
referenced above is that the latter are predicated on US law and, in particular, the 
disclosure requirements triggered by shareholders that pass a 5 per cent ownership 
threshold in a corporation. By contrast, in Canada, shareholders are generally 
required only to disclose equity holdings in excess of 10 per cent.9 Given that lead 
activists do not typically acquire a stake greater than 10 per cent in connection 
with their campaigns,10 wolf packs can form more easily in Canada without 
disclosing their presence. A situation in which a wolf pack is able to influence the 
governance of a Canadian corporation without disclosing its collective interest is 
therefore more likely.
Part I examines the role of blockholders in reducing agency costs in the 
corporation through monitoring. Part II analogizes the behaviour of wolf packs 
to blockholders and analyzes the characteristics of Canadian capital markets that 
facilitate wolf pack formation. Part III considers and evaluates the corporate 
and securities regulatory regime applicable to wolf packs, understanding that, 
at present, wolf packs and their regulation are harbingers of controversy in capital 
market regulation. In particular, we argue that, for the purposes of disclosure 
rules, wolf packs should be treated in the same manner as blockholders (i.e., 
shareholders that own a large amount of a corporation’s shares, usually between 
5 and 10 per cent, and can generally influence corporate direction by virtue of 
their share ownership). Because blockholders and wolf packs perform similar 
roles in the corporation, they should be treated as like entities in the eyes of the 
law. Part IV concludes.
I. MONITORING, COORDINATION, AND BLOCKHOLDERS
Following Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, it is widely recognized that the 
separation of ownership and control in the corporation can lead to a divergence 
between the interests of shareholders and those of directors and managers.11 While 
9. Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S-5, s 143.1(7) [OSA]. Furthermore, shareholders in US 
corporations have a ten-day window in which to purchase additional shares after crossing the 
5 per cent threshold, while shareholders in Canadian corporations must immediately cease 
the purchase of additional shares upon hitting the 10 per cent threshold.
10. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 24-25, 28.
11. Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New 
York: MacMillan, 1933) at 6.
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shareholders, whom Berle and Means refer to as owners,12 seek to maximize the 
value of their residual claim, managers may shirk their duties or divert corporate 
resources for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders.13 According to 
Jensen and Meckling, these divergent interests give rise to agency costs, which are 
costs that shareholders, as principals, incur to ensure that, as agents, directors and 
managers act in the corporation’s best interests.14 Shareholders may therefore be 
inclined to monitor these agents’ actions.
An implication of this conception of the firm is that directors and managers, 
as rational actors, may seek to entrench themselves. They may make themselves 
so valuable to the corporation that they are too costly to replace.15 They may 
also forego investments in profitable ventures by investing in specialized projects 
that require their unique expertise, even if these specialized alternatives will not 
be as profitable.16 Some argue, contrary to empirical evidence,17 that managers 
do not entrench themselves.18 However, as long as it is possible for management 
to prioritize its own interests above those of the corporation, the concept of 
management entrenchment remains relevant.19
The presence of a shareholder who owns a sizable percentage of a corporation’s 
equity—i.e., a blockholder—can mitigate agency costs through two mechanisms 
12. Although it is not uncontroversial to refer to shareholders as the “owners” of the corporation, 
the theoretical concerns raised by Berle and Means remain relevant. See Lynn Stout, The 
Shareholder Value Myth (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2012).
13. Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305 at 308. See also Frank H 
Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1991).
14. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13. See also Lucian Bebchuk, “The Myth of the Shareholder 
Franchise” (November 2006) Harvard John M Olin Discussion Paper Series No 567.
15. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, “Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager- 
Specific Investments” (1989) 25 J Fin Econ 123 at 125.
16. Ibid.
17. Lucian A Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, “Bundling and Entrenchment” (2010) Harvard John M 
Olin Discussion Paper Series No 659; Paul Borochin & John D Knopf, “Do Managers Seek 
Control and Entrenchment?” (2015) [unpublished], online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670918>.
18. See Alfred D Chandler, Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977). On the role of the board in keeping 
managers from entrenching themselves, see Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance” (2003) 97:2 Nw U L Rev 547.
19. Anita Anand, “The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?” 
(2015) 61:1 McGill LJ 1 at 15.
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that discipline management: “voice” and “exit.”20 On the one hand, voice 
involves the blockholder’s direct intervention in the firm, such as through letters 
to management, shareholder proposals, or the exercise of control or voting rights. 
Managers are compelled to act in the interests of shareholders (or at least those 
of the blockholder) out of fear of replacement. On the other hand, exit involves 
the sale of the blockholder’s shares. The sale can have the effect of driving down 
the firm’s share price, thereby punishing management ex post.21 The threat of exit 
imposes an ex ante discipline on managers.
The blockholder’s role in monitoring management and the board is central to 
its decision to exercise voice or exit. The larger the blockholder, the more readily 
it can absorb the cost of monitoring; its sizeable position in the corporation 
gives it added incentive to ensure that management is held accountable.22 The 
blockholder will intervene only when the costs of intervention are outweighed by 
the private benefits of doing so. Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive, 
or at least a neutral, relationship between blockholders and firm value.23 The 
presence of blockholders is associated with improved outcomes for shareholders 
on matters ranging from executive compensation to the facilitation of takeover 
bids.24 The benefits provided by the blockholder’s monitoring flow through to 
other shareholders, who are able to free-ride on the blockholder’s activism.
Of course, blockholders’ incentives to monitor (including their willingness 
to internalize the costs of free-riding by other shareholders) vary with the 
size of their block.25 Small investors can absorb only a negligible share of the 
20. See Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); Alex Edmans, “Blockholders 
and Corporate Governance” (2014) European Corporate Governance Institute - Finance 
Working Paper No 385, online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2285781>; Brav, Dasgupta & Mathews, supra note 8. For a seminal theoretical paper on 
the role of blockholders in reducing agency costs, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, 
“Large Shareholders and Corporate Control” (1986) 94:3 J Political Econ 461.
21. See Edmans, supra note 20 at 2-3.
22. Lucian A Bebchuk & Robert J Jackson, Jr, “The Law and Economics of Blockholder 
Disclosure” (2012) 2 Harv Bus L Rev 39 at 47 [“Blockholder Disclosure”].
23. See especially Henrik Cronqvist & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, “Large Shareholders and 
Corporate Policies” (2009) 22:10 Rev Fin Studies 3941. For a general summary of the 
empirical literature relating to firm performance, see Edmans, supra note 20 at 35-38; 
Clifford G Holderness, “A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control” (2003) 9:1 
Econ Pol’y Rev 51.
24. For a summary of this literature, see Bebchuk, “Blockholder Disclosure,” supra note 23 at 48.
25. Andrew Winton, “Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm” (1993) 
48:2 J Fin 487 at 493.
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firm’s risk, leaving them with insufficient incentives to monitor.26 Put another 
way, only large blockholders will monitor firms with high monitoring costs.27 
Evidence further suggests that multiple small blockholders are not as effective 
in influencing corporate decision making as is a single large blockholder, partly 
because coordination costs between the small blockholders impede their ability 
to monitor the firm.28 As such, a group of small shareholders that collectively 
owns a block of shares equivalent in size and rights to a block owned by a single 
large blockholder will likely produce less effective monitoring.29 It is simply 
more difficult to organize behaviour among a group of dispersed shareholders,30 
especially when shareholders have heterogeneous preferences.31
In short, the presence of a single large blockholder can have a beneficial 
effect on the firm’s governance by reducing agency costs through monitoring. 
At the same time, however, blocks of multiple small shareholders are less effective 
at fulfilling the role of the blockholder in a corporation. As will be discussed 
in Part II, below, under certain conditions wolf packs are able to overcome the 
coordination costs that impede blocks of small shareholders. In this way, they 
operate in a manner analogous to that of a single large blockholder.
26. Ibid.
27. Amrita Dhillon & Silvia Rossetto, “Corporate Control and Multiple Large Shareholders” 
(2009) University of Warwick Working Paper No 891 at 30-32.
28. See Winton, supra note 25.
29. John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “Agency Problems, Legal Strategies 
and Enforcement” (2009) Harvard John M Olin Discussion Paper Series No 644 at 3, 
online: <www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Kraakman_644.pdf>. 
Although the presence of a single, large blockholder tends to increase shareholder monitoring 
of management, it is worth bearing in mind the possibility that the blockholder will seek to 
extract private benefits of control to the detriment of other shareholders (as discussed more 
fully below, in Part II).
30. Andrew Kulpa, “The Wolf in Shareholder’s Clothing: Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game 
Theory and Voting Structures to Exploit Corporate Control and Governance” (2005) 6 UC 
Davis Bus LJ 4.
31. Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 29 at 3. It is worth noting, however, that the 
coordination issues that hinder shareholder intervention strategies actually make the threat 
of exit stronger, thereby allowing many small blockholders to have a positive impact on 
managerial discipline. See Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, “Governance Through Trading 
and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders” (2011) 24:7 Rev Fin Stud 2395 
(arguing that the threat of trading activity by multiple blockholders in the face of poor 
managerial performance disciplines management). Even so, wolf packs ostensibly form to 
intervene and agitate for change, not to passively invest and then exit.
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II. WOLF PACK BEHAVIOUR
In Part I, we argued that blockholders perform an important monitoring function 
when they are incentivized to do so (i.e., when the private benefits of such 
monitoring outweigh its costs). In this Part, we argue that wolf packs are a type 
of blockholder and that they, too, perform an important monitoring function. 
We note that reliable empirical data on the incidence of wolf packs is challenging 
to obtain since ungrouped shareholders are not obliged to make disclosures in 
connection with their collective position.32 We postulate, however, that a wolf 
pack will form only when it is able to overcome the monitoring costs and the 
coordination costs identified in Part I, above.
Two hypotheses explaining wolf pack formation dominate the nascent 
academic literature.33 Under what we term an “explicit coordination model,” 
Coffee and Palia argue that a lead activist will recruit other investors to join the 
pack before filing the required disclosure (a Schedule 13D in the United States, 
equivalent to an early warning report in Canada).34 Subsequent members of the 
pack are rewarded with a riskless arbitrage opportunity in return for their support 
of the lead activist’s agenda: The lead activist tips off the pack’s other members 
before filing its Schedule 13D, which is generally associated with a jump in the 
share price.35 As such, before disclosure is made, the wolf pack is formed through 
the explicit coordination efforts of the lead activist. Bratton notes that although 
the purchase activity of subsequent members of the pack makes it more expensive 
for the lead activist to make further purchases in the target corporation, the fact 
that the lead activist is required to share its gains with other members of the pack 
does not inhibit the activist from assuming a lead position.36 It is important to 
note that just as members of the wolf pack are careful to avoid “acting jointly or 
in concert” for the purposes of disclosure rules, they are also careful not to breach 
insider trading and tipping laws.37
Under an alternative hypothesis, which we term the “implicit coordination 
model,” Brav and others assert that wolf pack formation is driven by a coordination 
32. Becht, supra note 2 at 9-10.
33. See also Wong, supra note 6.
34. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 24-25, 28.
35. Ibid at 27-29.
36. William Bratton, “Hedge Funds and Governance Targets: Long-Term Results” (2010) 
University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No 10-17 at 
1384, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677517>.
37. In particular, each member of the wolf pack would be careful to avoid being classified as an 
“insider” or as in a “special relationship with the reporting issuer.”
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game in which individual shareholders are incentivized to join without explicit 
coordination by a lead member.38 Wolf packs arise spontaneously because 
investors generally monitor the same corporations at the same times. Each 
small independent investor on its own lacks sufficient incentive to monitor and 
intervene because the probability of a successful campaign is low and the expected 
benefits do not outweigh the costs. However, the entry of a large investor, whose 
position is conveyed to the other small investors through the filing of disclosure 
when it passes the 5 per cent ownership threshold, operates as a catalytic event 
that increases the expected probability of a successful intervention and in turn 
compels small investors to join the intervention and thus form a wolf pack. The 
rational self-interest of the members of the wolf pack is sufficient for the wolf 
pack to form on the basis of implicit coordination after the lead activist discloses 
its position to the market.
Neither of these models is entirely applicable to the study of wolf packs in 
Canada because both are predicated on US law and, in particular, the filing of a 
Schedule 13D, which is triggered at a 5 per cent ownership threshold. In Canada, 
shareholders are generally only required to disclose equity holdings in excess of 
10 per cent.39 Given that lead activists do not typically acquire a stake greater 
than 10 per cent in connection with their campaigns,40 wolf packs in Canada can 
generally form without the disclosure of a lead activist’s presence. Furthermore, 
there are additional reasons for a lead activist to remain below a 10 per cent 
ownership threshold in respect of a Canadian issuer.41
We believe that five unique conditions (either separately or together) can 
give rise to shareholder coordination in the form of a wolf pack and that in some 
sense these conditions undermine the formation of wolf packs in Canada because 
of the nature of capital markets in this country. The first condition, notable for 
its rarity in Canada, relates to the nature of the target corporation’s shareholder 
base. If a corporation’s shares are widely held, the formation of a wolf pack is 
more likely. In Canada, however, many public corporations are dominated by 
38. Brav, Dasgupta & Mathews supra note 8.
39. OSA, supra note 9, s 143.1(7).
40. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 24-25, 28.
41. For instance, crossing the 10 per cent ownership threshold requires the shareholder to 
immediately cease subsequent purchases in the issuer for a full business day and immediately 
file a disclosure report, and it will implicate insider trading and tipping laws based on the 
shareholder’s “special relationship” with the issuer.
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a controlling shareholder42 who is often the founder or the founder’s family.43 
Wolf packs, and activist interventions generally, are unlikely to be effective in 
controlled corporations since voting control of the corporation resides with 
the founder: Regardless of the size of the wolf pack’s position, it will always be 
out-voted by the controlling shareholder (unless the controlling shareholder 
forms part of the wolf pack).44 As a result, a proxy contest or the threat thereof 
may be an ineffective means of agitating for change in the corporation.
Second, in addition to a widely held corporation without a controlling 
shareholder, the presence of an institutional shareholder can facilitate wolf pack 
formation. The institution may or may not take on the role of lead activist. 
Regardless, it is sophisticated and will fulfill a monitoring function, a by-product 
of which is to allow subsequent members of the wolf pack to free-ride on its 
efforts. This is especially important in the context of the Canadian capital 
markets, where corporations’ share ownership tends to be dominated by large 
institutional holders.45 In some cases, pensions funds—which are not typically 
activists46—may join together with investors that are willing to take on an activist 
role within the corporation.47
Third, wolf packs, by definition, will have a lead that must bear the up-front 
costs of monitoring before convincing other shareholders to join. It is unlikely 
that the lead activist will begin a campaign for governance reform where any 
gains are likely to be modest; rather, it will likely act only when the promised 
gains are substantial, as in the case of a change of control. The lead activist is 
willing to bear these monitoring costs up front because the likelihood of a wolf 
pack’s achieving at least one of its intended outcomes is significantly higher than 
42. Bozec, Dia & Bozec, “Corporate Ownership,” supra note 5 at 56.
43. Walid Ben-Amar & Paul André, “Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring 
Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada” (2006) 33:3 J Bus Fin & 
Accting 517 at 518.
44. For example, Pershing square’s 2006 activist campaign in respect of Canadian Tire 
Corporation was halted in its tracks by the daughter of a co-founder of the company, who 
controlled 61 per cent of the company’s voting shares through a dual-class structure. See 
Lori McLeod, “US Hedge Fund Kicks the Tire,” Financial Post (4 July 2006) online: <www.
canadianhedgewatch.com/content/news/general/?id=817>.
45. For recent statistics on pension fund ownership of Canadian equities, see Vijay Jog & 
Jack Mintz, “Sovereign Wealth and Pension Funds Controlling Canadian Businesses: 
Tax-Policy Implications” (2013) 6:5 SPP Research Papers 1, online: University of Calgary 
School of Public Policy <http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/
jogmintz-pensionwealth.pdf>.
46. John A Doukas, Chansong Kim & Christos Pantzalis, “Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and 
Company Characteristics” (2000) 56:6 Financial Analysts Journal 54.
47. Re Magna International Inc (2011), 34 OSCB 1290, 72 BLR (4th) 235.
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that of an individual activist.48 As a result, the expected benefits of monitoring 
rise relative to the costs.
We must remember that the lead activist’s position will likely send a signal 
to other investors. By the time the leader contacts other shareholders, it will 
have fulfilled at least a portion of its self-imposed monitoring function, thereby 
allowing subsequent members of the wolf pack to free ride on its efforts. Because 
the institutional investors that tend to hold sizable positions in Canadian 
corporations are not generally activists, they may benefit from a lead activist who 
has borne the costs of monitoring up front.
As a result, wolf packs might be more likely to feature alliances between 
a hedge fund, as lead activist, and one or more institutional investors. For 
example, the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board publicly supported 
William Ackman’s activist campaign at CP Rail in 2012.49 These alliances are 
understandable given the empirical research on wolf packs that suggests that lead 
activists may tip off other funds with which they have existing relationships.50 In 
other words, and as a fourth condition, wolf packs will typically comprise repeat 
groups of shareholders, or at least the presence of a given member of the wolf pack 
will be associated with a particular group of shareholders that comprises the pack.
The alliances between members of the wolf pack are facilitated by a fifth 
condition, namely the current legal regime relating to shareholder coordination in 
respect of Canadian corporations. Shareholders can be incentivized to join a wolf 
pack because of the opportunity for riskless profit provided by the spike in share 
48. Becht, supra note 2 at 23-24 (finding a 78 per cent success rate for wolf packs compared with 
a 46 per cent success rate for other activists).
49. Brent Jang & Jacquie McNish, “CPPIB backs Pershing Square in CP proxy row,” The 
Globe and Mail (18 June 2012) online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/
cppib-backs-pershing-square-in-cp-proxy-row/article4106482>.
50. Wong, supra note 6. See also Anita Anand, “Proxy Battles in Canada: Can shareholder 
activists be long-term thinkers?” (25 March 2015), online: Canadian Investment Review 
<www.investmentreview.com/analysis-research/proxy-battles-in-canada-6829>; Anita Anand, 
“Shareholder Activism,” in PM Vasudev & Susan Watson, eds, Global Capital Markets 
[forthcoming in August 2017].
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price that tends to follow the filing of an early warning report.51 Even without 
filing the report, the lead activist can manufacture a comparable share price 
appreciation by notifying potential members of the wolf pack of its intentions to 
initiate a proxy contest or to agitate for a sale of the target.52 Indeed, the threat 
of a proxy contest is perhaps more credible under Canadian securities laws than 
in other jurisdictions because the public broadcast exemption in Canadian laws 
allows a dissident shareholder to wage a proxy contest relatively inexpensively 
without the need to prepare and mail a proxy circular to other shareholders.53 In 
addition, under the fifteen-shareholder proxy solicitation exemption, a dissident 
shareholder is permitted to solicit proxies from a limited number of shareholders 
without having to prepare and mail a dissident proxy circular.54
In the absence of the foregoing conditions, it may be too costly or impractical 
for a wolf pack to form. The first condition (or “non-condition”) relates to 
the nature of a corporation’s shareholder base: Corporations with controlling 
shareholders are not likely to be targeted by wolf packs. The second condition 
relates to the presence of large institutional shareholders, which can team with 
or support a lead activist’s agenda. The third condition relates to the lead activist: 
The leader will assume a monitoring function and will enable other institutions 
or smaller investors to free-ride, thereby potentially broadening the scope of 
51. In the United States, empirical studies have indicated that Schedule 13D disclosure results 
in a positive abnormal share price appreciation (even if only in the short term). As such, 
in respect of US companies, members of wolf packs that purchase shares before the lead 
member of the pack files its disclosure obtain a riskless profit. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 
4 at 3, 28, 65. For other empirical effects of shareholder activism, see Lucian A Bebchuk, 
Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, “The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism” (2015) 115 
Columbia L Rev 1085. To the extent that public knowledge of an activist involvement with 
an issuer would result in a similar share price appreciation in Canada with the filing of an 
early warning report, members of a wolf pack have a similar opportunity at riskless profit 
when the lead member of the pack announces its position.
52. Empirical work has shown that the announcement of a proxy contest is associated with 
positive abnormal share price appreciation. See Lisa F Borstadt & Thomas J Zwirlein, “The 
Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control 
Changes and Firm Performance” (1992) 21:3 Fin Mgmt 22 at 23.
53. This exemption allows a dissident shareholder to communicate with other shareholders 
through a website, press release, public broadcast, or public speech without having to prepare 
and mail a proxy circular. See Ontario Securities Commission, National Instrument 51-102: 
Continuous Disclosure Obligation (31 May 2013), 36 OSCB 2619, s 9.2 [NI 51-102].
54. Ibid, s 9.2. This exemption contrasts with the relatively stricter shareholder communication 
and proxy rules in the United States. For a discussion of these rules, see Stephen Choi, 
“Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms” (2010) UC Berkeley Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No 7, online: SSRN <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=219933>.
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support for the wolf pack’s intervention. Fourth, wolf packs are likely to feature 
alliances between repeat players. The final condition relates to the legal regime. 
Rules that lessen disclosure and alleviate the burden of filing proxy materials 
facilitate wolf pack formation. We now turn to the current legal regime and its 
necessary reforms.
III. THE LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE TO WOLF PACKS
There are no formal rules relating to wolf packs per se, but their coordinated 
nature implicates rules relating to proxy solicitation, early warning reporting and, 
possibly, insider trading. While wolf packs form loose networks of investors, they 
generally seek to accumulate a base of support without triggering the shareholder 
disclosure obligations that would arise if the group’s aggregate position 
exceeded certain ownership thresholds. In this section, we examine competing 
considerations—including wolf packs’ likely preferences—regarding the 
prevailing legal regime and consider whether changes to this regime are warranted.
A. THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE OF SECURITIES DISCLOSURE RULES
Generally speaking, wolf packs prefer less disclosure to more, likely because of 
the constraints that disclosure places on their behaviour.55 A loose disclosure 
regime allows wolf packs to outflank corporate defences such as poison pills that 
are triggered when a shareholder or group of shareholders passes a prescribed 
ownership threshold. It is impossible to trigger a poison pill when the size of 
the wolf pack’s position remains unknown. In addition, activists can leverage 
their superior information regarding the size of the pack when engaging the 
target board.56 Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that Schedule 13D 
disclosure is associated with positive abnormal share price appreciation.57 As such, 
it becomes more expensive for a shareholder to purchase shares in a corporation 
after filing this disclosure; efficient markets force large shareholders to buy at 
prices that reflect their own price impact after any disclosure is filed, which eats 
into their returns.58
55. See Wong, supra note 6 at 31 (“…timely and reliable disclosures constrain the ability of block 
holders to secure private benefits…”).
56. Ibid at 23-32.
57. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 27, 30-31; Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, “Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism,” supra note 51.
58. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 27-28, 30-31.
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On the one hand, a legal regime that makes it easier for wolf packs to form 
and requires less disclosure regarding their investments renders it more likely 
that the monitoring benefits engendered by large blockholders, discussed above 
in Part I, will materialize. On the other hand, many investors may find the mere 
presence or identity of a wolf pack to be material in making investment decisions. 
A lenient disclosure regime for wolf packs may allow them to accumulate de 
facto control blocks without paying other shareholders a control premium and 
may facilitate “creeping control” acquisitions. These concerns are relevant to (but 
distinct from) the so-called “short-termism” that hedge funds may exhibit when 
they are more committed to short-term value maximization than to managers’ 
long-term strategies for the corporation.
In the face of these competing arguments, is more or less disclosure regarding 
wolf pack formation appropriate? One rationale for securities disclosure laws 
relates to price efficiency:59 Public issuers are mandated to disclose material 
information so that investors can determine prices for securities that accurately 
reflect all such information.60 There is also a strand of literature that calls for 
mandatory disclosure on the basis that such disclosure reduces agency costs 
between managers and shareholders: Disclosure makes monitoring easier and 
decreases the likelihood that managers can use corporate assets for self-interested 
purposes at the expense of the corporation.61
The rationale for blockholder disclosure follows a similar logic. 
It is well-recognized that blockholders can extract private benefits of control, 
which can impose costs on other shareholders.62 Blockholder non-disclosure 
can also facilitate “creeping control” acquisitions, as discussed above.63 A regime 
requiring blockholders to disclose their respective positions protects against 
these risks and allows investors to take into account the presence of a wolf 
pack as a blockholder in valuing securities. It would also reduce the potential 
59. For a discussion of the efficient markets hypothesis, see Eugene F Fama, “Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work” (1970) 25:2 J Fin 383.
60. For a general discussion of the relationship between disclosure and price efficiency, see Anita 
Anand, “Fairness at What Price? An Analysis of the Regulation of Going-Private Transactions 
in OSC Policy 9.1” (1998) 43 McGill LJ 115. For insight into the importance of price 
efficiency in public markets, see ibid.
61. Paul G Mahoney, “Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems” (1995) 62:3 U 
Chicago L Rev 1047 at 1048.
62. Michael J Barclay & Clifford G Holderness, “Private Benefits from Control of Public 
Corporations” (1989) 25 J Fin Econ 371.
63. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 31-36, 72.
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costs associated with significant shareholders who exert undue influence on the 
corporation for private gain.
B. WOLF PACK FORMATION AND DISCLOSURE RULES
Under Canadian securities law, disclosure rules affecting the formation and 
disclosure of wolf packs generally fall under the early warning reporting system, 
which prescribes disclosure rules for blockholders that may influence corporate 
control or direction.64 As the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) explain:
Accumulations may be material information to the market even when not made 
to change or influence control of the issuer … . Market participants may also be 
concerned about who has the ability to vote significant blocks, as these can affect the 
outcome of control transactions, the constitution of the issuer’s board of directors 
and the approval of significant proposals or transactions. The mere identity and 
presence of an institutional shareholder may be material to some investors.65
Recently, the CSA have confirmed that the objectives of the early warning 
reporting system apply to proxy-related matters.66 As such, the rationale for the 
early warning reporting system is tied to the perceived need to alert the market of 
impending or potential change of control transactions, including proxy contests.
Under the early warning system, shareholders who acquire more than 10 
per cent of an issuer’s outstanding securities must disclose their positions to the 
market in a promptly filed news release and early warning report, and must file 
additional disclosures upon any additional 2 per cent purchase of the issuer’s 
securities.67 Unlike the insider reporting regime, the early warning reporting 
system deems shares purchased by those who act jointly or in concert with the 
acquiror to have also been purchased by the acquiror, such that their collective 
ownership is aggregated for the purposes of determining whether the 10 per cent 
threshold has been crossed.68 For instance, an acquiror with a 7 per cent stake 
64. Continental Precious Metals Inc v Singh, 2012 ONSC 7122 at para 12 [Commercial List].
65. Canadian Securities Administrators, “CSA Notice and Request for Comment: Proposed 
Amendments” (13 July 2013), online: Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/
en/SecuritiesLaw_mi_20130313_62-104_take-over-bids.htm>.
66. Canadian Securities Administrators, “CSA Notice and Request for Comment: Proposed 
Amendments” (10 October 2014), online: Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.
on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_mi_20130313_62-104_take-over-bids.htm> [ “2014 Notice”].
67. Ontario Securities Commission, National Instrument 62-103: The Early Warning System 
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in a given issuer would be required to file an early warning report if it were 
acting jointly or in concert with another shareholder holding a 4 per cent stake. 
Determining whether parties are acting jointly or in concert is a question of 
fact,69 and there is limited case law addressing the issue.70 Of course, how courts 
(or the regulator, in the form of tribunal decisions and policy directives) interpret 
the breadth of this statutory language will have a significant impact on how wolf 
packs form and on the nature and timing of their disclosure obligations.
The rules relating to shareholder disclosure set out above expose a tension 
at the heart of wolf packs and related regulation. On the one hand, blockholder 
formation is valuable in imposing managerial discipline and reducing agency 
costs, the benefits of which flow to all shareholders. In this regard, rules that 
facilitate the formation of wolf packs—such as a higher 10 per cent disclosure 
threshold and a narrow reading of what it means “to act jointly and in concert” 
with another shareholder—are desirable. On the other hand, rules that permit 
wolf packs to organize without comprehensive disclosure can be unfair to 
shareholders who are unable to obtain and analyze material information about 
who exercises effective control of the companies in which they have chosen to 
invest. In light of the foregoing, what is the optimal regulatory regime to balance 
these competing aims?
Any response to this question likely begins with the mandate of the regulator, 
which has a legal duty to protect investors on a prospective and preventative basis 
69. OSA, supra note 9, s 90.
70. See e.g. Re Sears Canada (2006), 35 OSCB 8781, 22 BLR (4th) 145; Re Sterling Centrecorp 
Inc (2007), 30 OSCB 6683, 39 BLR (4th) 263 [Re Sterling Centrecorp]. These decisions, 
and the others that interpret this statutory language, do so in the context of take-over bids, 
insider bids, and related party transactions. The OSC’s decision in Re Sterling Centrecorp is 
exemplary of the fact-specific nature of these decisions and the difficulty in applying them to 
wolf packs. The committee writes that:
[The] policy underlying the concept of identifying who is a “joint actor” … is to ensure that 
all persons or companies who are effectively engaged in a common investment or purchase 
program are required to abide by the requirements of Ontario securities laws … [and, 
further, that] determination of a joint actor relationship can be made if the facts establish 
that the parties in question played an integral role in planning, promoting and structuring the 
transaction to ensure its success beyond their customary role (ibid at para 102).
 An added issue is that many decisions that address the concept of “acting jointly or in 
concert” do so with reference to the definition of “joint actor” under certain national and 
multilateral instruments relating to takeover bids. It is an open question whether decisions 
determining a “joint actor” characterization under takeover bid rules would apply to the 
determination of whether shareholders are “acting jointly or in concert” for the purposes of 
early warning reporting.
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and can act in the public interest to do so.71 Although the “public interest” is 
undefined in the Ontario Securities Act (OSA), regulations, or regulatory policies, 
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) has suggested that it can apply the 
public interest power “where market conduct engages the animating principles” 
of the OSA.72 These principles include timely, accurate, and efficient disclosure 
of information; restrictions on fraudulent and unfair market practices and 
procedures; and maintenance of high standards of fitness and business conduct to 
ensure honest and responsible conduct by market participants.73 As the OSC has 
noted in prior decisions, a “sound financial disclosure system is fundamental to 
the operation of our capital markets.”74 Even if no harm results from misleading 
disclosure, a finding of abuse can result if the public could have “made investment 
decisions based on [a false] impression.”75 76 (find a better place for 75)
Wolf packs are effectively blockholders. Shareholders in wolf packs form de 
facto blocks to exert influence in the corporation, in much the same manner 
as a blockholder, but are able to avoid disclosure rules simply by preventing 
characterization of their behaviour as joint action. Thus, we believe that wolf 
packs should be regulated like blockholders. That is, they should be subject to 
early warning reporting when their collective interest rises above 10 per cent, just 
as a blockholder is subject to early warning reporting when its individual interest 
crosses that threshold. As the CSA has noted, “the mere identity and presence 
of an institutional shareholder may be material to some investors.”77 Investors 
should not need to make decisions in the absence of material information such 
as the existence of a wolf pack. Although blockholders fulfill an important 
monitoring role in the corporation, the regulator has presumably already weighed 
this benefit against the need for investors to make investment decisions with 
access to material information regarding blockholders. If this policy choice has 
been made in respect of blockholders, the law’s treatment of wolf packs should 
be no different.
As is clear from the foregoing analysis, central to the analogy between 
blockholders and wolf packs is the concept of “acting jointly and in concert.” 
Interpretation of this statutory language dictates whether wolf packs will be 
71. Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v Ontario (Securities 
Commission), 2001 SCC 37, [2001] 2 SCR 132; OSA, supra note 9, s 127.
72. Re Biovail Corp (2010), 33 OCSB 8914 at para 382.
73. OSA, supra note 9, s 2.1(2).
74. Re Standard Trustco (1992), 15 OSCB 4322, 6 BLR (2d) 241.
75. Ibid [emphasis added].
76. Ibid.
77. Canadian Securities Administrators, “2014 Notice,” supra note 66.
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subject to the same disclosure rules as blockholders: A narrow understanding 
of what qualifies as joint action allows individual members of the wolf pack to 
consider only their respective interests for the purposes of passing disclosure 
thresholds. For instance, in the US context, the Second Circuit held that three 
shareholders were not acting as a “group,” even though one shareholder “was a 
well-known raider and all three discussed amongst themselves how to improve 
the value of the target company.”78 Narrow applications of disclosure rules, like 
the one favoured by the Second Circuit, highlight the risk that wolf packs might 
extract private benefits of control, as is open to a block holder, but without the 
attendant disclosure obligations to which blockholders are subject. For this 
reason, we believe that the concept of “acting jointly and in concert” should 
be interpreted broadly to cover a wide range of communication and behaviours 
associated with wolf pack formation. In particular, tipping by the lead member of 
the wolf pack to other investors regarding its plans in relation to the target should 
qualify as joint conduct. Securities regulators should at a minimum issue a policy 
statement clarifying the statutory language to specify this point.
Although courts and tribunals are afforded broad latitude with respect to the 
remedies they may impose upon a breach of securities regulation, the judicial and 
regulatory posture on this point has traditionally been one of restraint. As one 
court recently stated, “the surgery should be done with a scalpel and not a battle 
axe.”79 In Genesis v Smoothwater, one of the few cases dealing with the scope 
of behaviour that qualifies as “acting jointly or in concert” in the context of a 
proposed proxy contest, the court refused to bar the wolf pack’s members from 
voting their shares despite holding that the wolf pack breached its disclosure 
obligations; instead, the court ordered the wolf pack to make appropriate 
disclosures regarding its joint action and delayed the annual general meeting 
of the shareholders until the shareholders had adequate time to review such 
disclosures.80 Future decisions should not accord wolf packs special status in the 
“acting jointly or in concert” analysis, especially in light of the potentially weak 
remedies imposed on them for non-compliance.81
Of course, underlying the foregoing discussion of the relationship between 
disclosure and wolf packs is a potential relationship between wolf pack formation 
78. See Hallwood Realty Partners LP v Gotham Partners, LP, 286 F.3d 613 (2d Cir 2002) and 
Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 39.
79. 820099 Ontario Inc v Harold E Ballard Ltd (1992), 3 BLR (2d) 113 (Ont Gen Div), 
25 ACWS (3d) 853, cited in Genesis Land Development Corp v Smoothwater Capital Corp, 
2013 ABQB 509 at para 69, 233 ACWS (3d) 70 [Genesis v Smoothwater].
80. Ibid at paras 70-71.
81. Coffee & Palia, supra note 4 at 42.
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and insider trading and tipping. The chance for riskless profit engendered 
by wolf packs—based on the relationships among specific institutional 
shareholders—seems to run contrary to the policy animating insider trading and 
tipping laws, which is to protect “investor confidence in the marketplace as a 
level playing field.”82 If the rules make tipping illegal by persons or companies 
contemplating takeover bids83 because of the premium such bids typically 
command, and the announcement of proxy contests usually results in a similar 
share price appreciation,84 then we can legitimately question why one type of 
behaviour is captured by tipping rules while the other is not. Securities regulators 
should consider whether tipping rules should apply to persons or companies 
contemplating proxy contests, which are just another form of change of control.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is challenging to ascertain precise figures on the incidence of wolf packs.85 
Nevertheless, this article represents a first step towards understanding the 
circumstances that engender their formation and the motivations that drive the 
behaviour of their members. As the law currently stands, wolf packs assume the 
role of blockholders in the corporation but without the disclosure obligations 
that blockholders are required to observe. While a legal regime that facilitates 
wolf pack formation (e.g., via a narrow conception of “acting jointly or in 
concert”) may make it easier for shareholders to monitor management and thus 
reduce agency costs in changes of control, these benefits should not come at 
the price of deficient disclosure. If a sound disclosure system is the cornerstone 
of securities regulation, then novel tactics aimed at circumventing that system 
should be more comprehensively regulated, especially when the system already 
captures analogous behaviour.
82. Disclosure Standards, OSC NP 51-201, (2013) 25 OSCB 4492 (31 May 2013).
83. See OSA, supra note 9, s 76(3).
84. And, in any event, both would be expected to have significant impacts on the value of a given 
company’s securities.
85. Thomas W Briggs, “Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: 
An Empirical Analysis” (2007) 32 J Corp L 681 at 698.
